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Towards	  a	  Comprehensive	  Social	  Security	  System:	  An	  Assessment	  of	  Recent	  
UBI	  Proposals1	  	   Dilip	  Mookherjee2	  	  	  Few	  people	  would	  disagree	  that	  welfare	  programmes	  in	  India	  are	  characterized	  by	  corruption,	  mis-­‐targeting,	  poor	  coordination,	  and	  impose	  high	  financial	  and	  environmental	  costs.	  A	  more	  pernicious	  consequence	  is	  the	  political	  culture	  of	  clientelistic	  vote	  buying	  they	  help	  create.	  Parties	  woo	  swing	  voters	  with	  delivery	  of	  private	  short-­‐term	  benefits	  such	  as	  MNREGA	  work,	  cheap	  food,	  liquor,	  sarees,	  domestic	  appliances,	  cash,	  subsidized	  loans,	  loan	  waivers	  and	  access	  to	  government	  services.	  Public	  goods	  or	  systematic	  programmes	  for	  lowering	  poverty,	  dependence,	  ignorance	  and	  disease	  (such	  as	  land	  reform,	  education,	  sanitation,	  public	  health)	  are	  neglected.	  Clientelism	  thrives	  on	  provision	  of	  short-­‐term	  benefits	  to	  a	  subsection	  of	  the	  poor,	  keeping	  them	  poor	  and	  perpetuating	  dependence	  on	  their	  patrons.	  Voting	  decisions	  of	  the	  poor	  are	  driven	  by	  self-­‐interested	  considerations	  of	  securing	  political	  patronage,	  rather	  than	  expressing	  judgment	  on	  governance.	  It	  is	  no	  wonder	  then	  that	  public	  policy	  disasters	  and	  corruption	  scandals	  scarcely	  dent	  vote	  margins	  of	  popular	  Chief	  Ministers.	  Democracy	  thereby	  fails	  to	  deliver	  government	  accountability	  or	  long	  term	  development.	  	  	  The	  prevalence	  of	  clientelistic	  politics	  in	  earlier	  stages	  of	  development	  has	  been	  the	  experience	  of	  many	  other	  countries	  as	  well.	  The	  process	  of	  development	  is	  usually	  aided	  and	  transformed	  when	  clientelistic	  politics	  is	  replaced	  by	  programmatic	  politics	  characterized	  by	  universal	  formula-­‐bound	  benefits	  such	  as	  comprehensive	  social	  security,	  widening	  of	  the	  formal	  sector,	  infrastructure	  and	  public	  health.	  A	  broad	  majority	  of	  citizens	  then	  have	  well-­‐defined	  rights,	  effectively	  enforced	  by	  functioning	  institutions	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  reducing	  dependence	  on	  local	  political	  patrons	  for	  their	  survival	  and	  security.	  Politicians	  are	  forced	  to	  compete	  via	  broad-­‐based	  public	  policy	  programmes	  rather	  than	  narrowly	  directed	  private	  benefits.	  Such	  a	  transformation	  occurred	  during	  the	  late	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  century	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  USA,	  and	  is	  currently	  under	  way	  in	  Mexico,	  Brazil	  and	  other	  middle	  income	  countries	  (e.g.,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  nationwide	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  programs	  (CCTs)).	  The	  time	  is	  ripe	  for	  India	  to	  embark	  on	  this	  transition.	  	  	  What	  would	  such	  a	  transformation	  entail?	  What	  is	  the	  best	  way	  to	  create	  a	  comprehensive	  system	  of	  social	  security?	  The	  aim	  would	  be	  to	  define	  and	  enforce	  rights	  for	  the	  entire	  population	  to	  a	  set	  of	  entitlements	  for	  economic	  and	  social	  security.	  Such	  entitlements	  would	  have	  to	  be	  formula	  bound,	  enforced	  by	  courts	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Text	  of	  presentation	  at	  the	  UBI	  Conference	  organized	  by	  the	  Indian	  Institute	  of	  Human	  Development,	  New	  Delhi,	  July	  10	  2017.	  I	  thank	  Parikshit	  Ghosh	  and	  Ashok	  Kotwal	  for	  comments	  on	  an	  earlier	  version.	  2	  Department	  of	  Economics,	  Boston	  University,	  270	  Bay	  State	  Road	  Boston	  MA	  02215;	  dilipm@bu.edu.	  
rather	  than	  discretion	  of	  politicians	  or	  bureaucrats.	  Their	  design	  would	  have	  to	  enhance	  coordination,	  reduce	  waste	  and	  the	  scope	  for	  corruption.	  	  	  While	  there	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  wide	  consensus	  on	  the	  long-­‐term	  goal,	  there	  are	  likely	  to	  many	  different	  views	  on	  specific	  details.	  Should	  benefits	  be	  in	  the	  form	  of	  cash	  or	  in	  kind?	  Should	  they	  be	  universal	  or	  targeted?	  Should	  they	  be	  unconditional,	  or	  conditioned	  on	  school	  enrollment	  and	  health	  check	  ups	  of	  children	  as	  in	  most	  CCTs?	  How	  large	  should	  the	  transfers	  be	  and	  how	  will	  they	  be	  financed?	  How	  should	  government	  spending	  be	  allocated	  between	  public	  infrastructure,	  health	  and	  education,	  and	  private	  welfare	  benefits?	  Should	  private	  transfers	  be	  made	  to	  households	  or	  individuals?	  How	  should	  they	  be	  delivered,	  via	  direct	  bank	  transfers,	  mobile	  transfers,	  ATMs	  or	  paid	  out	  by	  local	  governments?	  	  	  Universal	  Basic	  Income	  (UBI)	  is	  a	  specific	  proposal,	  variants	  of	  which	  have	  advanced	  recently	  for	  India	  respectively	  by	  Pranab	  Bardhan,	  Vijay	  Joshi,	  and	  the	  2017	  Government	  of	  India	  Economic	  Survey	  (GOIES).	  They	  are	  all	  designed	  to	  supplement	  rather	  than	  substitute	  existing	  public	  education,	  health	  and	  infrastructure	  programs.	  Hence	  the	  objective	  is	  not	  to	  reduce	  spending	  on	  public	  goods.	  Instead,	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  widen	  coverage,	  reduce	  leakages	  and	  improve	  coordination.	  But	  they	  do	  generate	  important	  questions	  concerning	  design,	  implementation,	  affordability	  and	  political	  feasibility,	  which	  I	  appraise	  below.	  	  	  
Design	  All	  three	  plans	  involve	  unconditional	  cash	  transfers.	  This	  raises	  a	  number	  of	  important	  problems.	  First,	  even	  if	  the	  transfers	  were	  indexed	  for	  inflation,	  they	  would	  not	  adjust	  adequately	  for	  spatial	  differences	  in	  food	  prices,	  nor	  insure	  vulnerable	  households	  against	  natural	  disasters	  or	  local	  weather	  shocks.	  There	  is	  evidence	  that	  NREGA	  provides	  such	  insurance	  to	  vulnerable	  sections	  of	  the	  population,	  and	  that	  citizens	  in	  some	  remote	  areas	  with	  poorly	  functioning	  markets	  prefer	  to	  receive	  in-­‐kind	  transfers	  than	  cash.	  Second,	  conditioning	  transfers	  on	  investments	  in	  education	  or	  health	  of	  children	  as	  in	  CCTs	  would	  likely	  promote	  such	  investments,	  and	  thereby	  lower	  long	  term	  poverty.	  	  UBI	  proponents	  argue	  that	  incorporating	  local	  weather	  shocks,	  food	  prices	  or	  school	  enrolment	  as	  determinants	  of	  cash	  transfers	  would	  render	  the	  scheme	  complex,	  difficult	  to	  administer,	  and	  open	  the	  door	  for	  corruption	  or	  political	  discretion.	  That	  may	  well	  be	  true	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  but	  then	  one	  has	  to	  accept	  that	  in-­‐kind	  transfers	  may	  well	  provide	  better	  security	  on	  some	  dimensions	  over	  UBI.	  There	  has	  not	  been	  sufficient	  research	  on	  this	  issue,	  so	  we	  do	  not	  yet	  have	  a	  solid	  base	  of	  evidence	  to	  evaluate	  this	  trade-­‐off.	  Defenders	  of	  existing	  in-­‐kind	  programmes	  argue	  that	  administration	  of	  existing	  in-­‐kind	  transfer	  schemes	  have	  improved	  markedly	  in	  some	  states,	  so	  it	  may	  be	  better	  to	  focus	  on	  improving	  their	  administration	  in	  other	  states	  rather	  than	  dismantling	  them	  altogether.	  	  Another	  frequently	  expressed	  concern	  regarding	  unconditional	  transfers	  is	  that	  they	  would	  encourage	  laziness	  and	  welfare	  dependence.	  However,	  the	  evidence	  available	  so	  far	  does	  not	  suggest	  this	  would	  be	  a	  significant	  problem.	  There	  can	  be	  ethical	  concerns:	  the	  affluent	  and	  healthy	  would	  receive	  the	  same	  as	  the	  poor	  and	  the	  sick.	  
This	  strikes	  many	  as	  intrinsically	  unfair,	  besides	  wasting	  public	  money.	  Indeed,	  such	  concerns	  have	  caused	  UBI	  proposals	  to	  be	  unpopular	  with	  middle	  class	  taxpayers	  even	  in	  affluent	  countries.	  The	  same	  could	  well	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  true	  in	  India	  as	  well.	  	  	  These	  concerns	  could	  be	  addressed	  by	  modifying	  the	  design	  of	  UBI	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  diluting	  its	  simplicity	  and	  universality.	  	  Transfers	  could	  be	  conditioned	  on	  local	  cost-­‐of-­‐living	  indices	  and	  extreme	  weather	  events.	  Conditioning	  on	  educational	  enrollment	  and	  health	  checkups	  would	  raise	  complexity	  and	  costs	  of	  enforcement.	  Registered	  schools	  and	  medical	  facilities	  would	  have	  to	  submit	  enrollment	  information	  to	  relevant	  government	  authorities	  before	  transfers	  are	  paid	  out.	  This	  would	  not	  be	  easy	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  but	  conceivably	  could	  be	  set	  up	  in	  the	  next	  decade	  or	  so.	  	  Transfers	  ought	  to	  be	  conditioned	  on	  measures	  of	  household	  size	  (or	  number	  of	  children	  in	  the	  case	  they	  are	  paid	  to	  individuals)	  in	  any	  case.	  They	  could	  be	  conditioned	  additionally	  on	  information	  in	  the	  public	  domain	  on	  correlates	  of	  need:	  age,	  gender,	  marital	  status,	  number	  of	  dependents,	  or	  disability,	  as	  they	  are	  in	  social	  security	  systems	  around	  the	  world.	  Those	  owing	  property	  above	  some	  thresholds	  similar	  to	  presumptive	  norms	  already	  used	  by	  the	  Income	  Tax	  department	  (property	  or	  durable	  assets	  owned)	  could	  be	  ineligible.	  Or	  they	  could	  be	  discouraged	  e.g.,	  via	  public	  appeals,	  and	  periodic	  requirements	  to	  appear	  for	  verification	  at	  appointed	  government	  offices	  or	  banks	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  public	  pensions.	  	  	  
Implementation	  The	  key	  issue	  in	  implementation	  concerns	  the	  way	  to	  actually	  deliver	  the	  transfers.	  The	  basic	  infrastructure	  backbone	  exists	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Aadhar	  cards.	  Last	  mile	  service	  connectivity	  would	  be	  a	  real	  problem	  especially	  in	  remote	  rural	  areas	  where	  large	  sections	  of	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  populations	  reside.	  A	  large	  proportion	  do	  not	  yet	  have	  functioning	  bank	  accounts	  (30-­‐40%)	  or	  mobile	  money	  accounts	  (80%).	  Coverage	  is	  uneven	  across	  income	  class,	  gender,	  age,	  literacy,	  and	  rural/urban	  areas,	  and	  likely	  to	  be	  lowest	  among	  those	  most	  in	  need.	  Even	  owning	  bank	  accounts	  does	  not	  ensure	  easy	  access	  or	  absence	  of	  leakages,	  judging	  from	  various	  case	  studies.	  A	  large	  proportion	  of	  bank	  accounts	  are	  dormant,	  as	  usage	  is	  limited	  by	  distance	  from	  bank	  branches,	  and	  lack	  of	  familiarity	  with	  bank	  procedures	  among	  the	  poor	  and	  illiterate.	  Mobile	  money	  accounts	  will	  greatly	  ease	  these	  problems,	  but	  penetration	  of	  mobile	  money	  transfers	  is	  still	  limited	  in	  India	  (2%	  in	  2014,	  compared	  with	  58%	  in	  Kenya).	  In	  remote	  areas	  these	  would	  need	  to	  be	  supplemented	  	  by	  local	  kirana	  stores	  or	  Banking	  Correspondents,	  micro-­‐ATMs	  or	  Point-­‐of-­‐Sale	  machines.	  	  There	  is	  still	  some	  way	  for	  India	  to	  go	  in	  terms	  of	  financial	  development	  before	  a	  direct	  transfer	  system	  becomes	  truly	  widespread	  in	  coverage.	  	  	  
Scale	  and	  Financing	  What	  can	  the	  country	  afford?	  Providing	  a	  minimum	  universal	  income	  at	  75%	  of	  poverty	  line	  would	  cost	  10%	  of	  GDP,	  which	  seems	  out	  of	  reach.	  Compare	  the	  cost	  in	  terms	  of	  percent	  GDP	  spent,	  with	  MNREGA	  (0.4%),	  food,	  kerosene	  and	  fertilizer	  subsidies	  (2-­‐2.5%).	  Hence	  3%	  could	  be	  spent	  on	  UBI	  without	  adding	  to	  financing	  costs,	  provided	  PDS,	  kerosene	  and	  fertilizer	  subsidies	  were	  eliminated.	  While	  some	  economists	  have	  advocated	  this	  option,	  the	  dismantling	  of	  these	  programmes	  will	  generate	  considerable	  disruption	  and	  political	  backlash.	  
Partly	  for	  this	  reason,	  existing	  UBI	  proposals	  propose	  to	  supplement	  them	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  but	  the	  government	  would	  then	  need	  to	  mobilize	  additional	  revenues.	  GOIES	  presents	  the	  most	  conservative	  plan,	  with	  a	  plan	  to	  spend	  around	  5%	  of	  GDP.	  Raising	  additional	  revenues	  on	  this	  scale	  will	  not	  be	  easy.	  	  	  A	  more	  reasonable	  target	  in	  the	  near	  term	  would	  be	  3.5%	  of	  GDP,	  which	  would	  fund	  a	  basic	  income	  of	  25%	  of	  the	  poverty	  line.	  This	  would	  amount	  to	  Rs	  250	  per	  person	  per	  month,	  or	  over	  Rs	  1000	  for	  the	  average	  household	  per	  month.	  Such	  benefits	  would	  still	  be	  substantial.	  Compare	  them	  for	  instance	  with	  MNREGA	  benefits	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  in	  2012	  which	  amounted	  to	  Rs	  146	  per	  week	  per	  beneficiary,	  or	  Rs	  560	  per	  month	  per	  household	  with	  one	  beneficiary.	  Compared	  with	  MNREGA,	  the	  proportion	  and	  coverage	  would	  increase	  very	  substantially,	  from	  less	  than	  30%	  to	  nearly	  90%	  of	  the	  population.	  This	  would	  be	  utterly	  transformative	  in	  terms	  of	  scope	  and	  coverage,	  besides	  reducing	  the	  scope	  for	  clientelistic	  politics	  and	  corruption,	  at	  approximately	  the	  same	  cost	  of	  existing	  subsidy	  programs.	  On	  these	  grounds,	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  a	  reasonable	  goal	  to	  phase	  out	  these	  subsidies	  and	  replace	  them	  by	  some	  variant	  of	  UBI	  on	  a	  similar	  scale	  of	  3-­‐3.5%	  of	  GDP	  over	  the	  coming	  years.	  Later,	  if	  fiscal	  resources	  permit	  it	  could	  be	  scaled	  up	  to	  5-­‐6%	  of	  GDP.	  	  	  Clearly,	  many	  design,	  implementation	  and	  financing	  details	  will	  need	  to	  be	  worked	  out	  along	  the	  way.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  develop	  a	  long	  term	  plan,	  according	  to	  which	  a	  new	  system	  can	  be	  phased	  in	  gradually	  over	  the	  next	  seven	  to	  ten	  years.	  In	  particular,	  undue	  haste	  ought	  to	  be	  avoided	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  it	  would	  be	  terrible	  if	  existing	  programmes	  were	  withdrawn	  before	  a	  new	  system	  has	  been	  successfully	  tested	  and	  scaled	  up.	  	  	  The	  first	  stage	  could	  cover	  old	  age	  pensions,	  starting	  with	  relatively	  easy-­‐to-­‐reach	  segments	  of	  the	  population	  in	  urban	  areas.	  The	  lessons	  learnt	  from	  this	  would	  help	  guide	  extensions	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  population.	  Necessary	  modifications	  to	  the	  plan	  may	  entail	  restrictions	  on	  its	  universality	  and	  imposition	  of	  conditionalities,	  whence	  it	  may	  not	  be	  recognizable	  as	  UBI	  any	  longer.	  Nevertheless,	  what	  really	  matters	  is	  that	  India	  transitions	  to	  a	  social	  security	  system	  that	  is	  well-­‐suited	  to	  its	  own	  specific	  conditions,	  where	  citizen	  entitlements	  are	  secured	  in	  a	  reliable,	  cost-­‐effective	  and	  non-­‐clientelistic	  manner.	  The	  scope	  for	  political	  discretion	  in	  deciding	  the	  scale	  and	  coverage	  of	  benefits	  needs	  to	  be	  minimized.	  Only	  then	  will	  the	  focus	  of	  political	  parties	  shift	  to	  improving	  governance	  in	  order	  to	  win	  elections.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
